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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
  
 We are here asked to decide whether a victim of a 
privately executed wiretap1 can successfully move to quash a 
subpoena duces tecum directing the perpetrator of the wiretap to 
convey recordings of unlawfully intercepted communications to a 
grand jury.  The district court denied the motions to quash.  
Since disclosure of the unlawfully intercepted communications to 
the grand jury would violate an explicit congressional 
prohibition, and enforcement of the subpoena would involve the 
courts in a violation of the victims’ statutory privacy rights, 
we will reverse the district court and remand with orders that 
the subpoena duces tecum be quashed. 
 
I.  Background 
 A.  Factual and Procedural History 
 Because this case relates to an ongoing grand jury 
proceeding, we will not refer to the parties by their proper 
names.  We will also limit our recitation of the facts to the 
minimum necessary to explain and resolve the issues presented.  
Fortunately, the relevant facts are undisputed. 
                     
     
1
"Wiretapping" is a general term used to refer to all types 
of illegal interceptions, including surreptitious recording of 
telephone conversations. 
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 Appellant-intervenor John Doe 1 is the target of a 
federal grand jury investigation (hereinafter "Doe 1" or "the 
target").  Doe 1 lived for some time with his brother, John Doe 2 
("Doe 2" or "the husband"), and his brother’s wife, John Doe 3 
("Doe 3" or "the witness").  For reasons that we need not detail, 
the witness installed devices on her home telephones that 
intercepted and recorded telephone conversations initiated from 
and coming into the home.  Both the target and the husband were 
parties to some of these conversations.  Neither the target nor 
the husband knew that their conversations were being intercepted 
and recorded, so neither therefore consented to the interception 
and recording. 
 Several weeks after the last conversation was recorded, 
appellee, the United States (“the government”), learned through 
an informant that the witness possessed tapes containing 
recordings of conversations involving the target and the husband. 
 The grand jury issued two subpoenas directed to the witness: a 
subpoena ad testificandum, requiring her to appear and answer 
questions before the grand jury, and a subpoena duces tecum, 
requiring her to produce the tapes so they may be played for the 
grand jury.  Only the subpoena duces tecum is involved in this 
appeal.2 
                     
     
2In a related case, In re Grand Jury, No. 97-7018, this 
court denied the witness’ motions to quash both of the subpoenas. 
 The witness had moved to quash on the basis of the privilege 
against adverse spousal testimony. 
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 The target and the husband filed motions to intervene 
and motions to quash the subpoena duces tecum directed to the 
witness.  Their motions contend that the target and husband are 
“aggrieved persons” within the meaning of § 2510(11) of Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
(hereinafter “Title III” or “the Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 
because they were parties to telephone communications unlawfully 
intercepted without their knowledge or consent.  Citing § 2515 of 
Title III, the target and husband argue that the contents of the 
tapes cannot be disclosed to the grand jury because such 
disclosure would be a violation of § 2511(1)(c). 
 Although the witness appeared before the grand jury and 
answered some of the government’s questions, she refused to 
produce the tapes.  The government therefore moved to compel the 
witness’ full compliance with both subpoenas.  The district court 
granted the government’s motion and, after further resistance 
from the witness, entered an order holding the witness in 
contempt.  The district court also granted the target and 
husband’s motions to intervene but denied their motions to 
quash.3  While acknowledging that Doe 3's wiretap violated Title 
III, the court agreed with the government that the evidentiary 
prohibition of § 2515 contains a “clean hands” exception 
permitting the submission of evidence of unlawfully intercepted 
                     
     
3The court did grant the motions to quash to the extent the 
subpoenas sought materials which would reveal confidential 
attorney-client or marital communications.  The government did 
not oppose granting the motions with regard to these two 
privileges and these issues are not before us in this appeal. 
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communications to a grand jury where the violation was committed 
by a private party acting independent of the government.  The 
target and the husband then filed this appeal.4 
 
 B.  Statutory Structure of Title III 
 “Title III’s complex provisions regulate both 
interception and disclosure of communications in great detail.”  
United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 855 (3d Cir. 1978).  
Various provisions of the Act are directly relevant to the 
jurisdictional and merits issues presented in this appeal.  
Before proceeding to those issues, it will be useful to describe 
the statutory structure of Title III and to set out the 
provisions that are most important to this case.5 
 Section 2511(1)(a) makes it a crime for any person to 
intentionally intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, 
or electronic communication.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); see also 
id. § 2510 (definitions).  Section 2511(1)(c) makes any 
disclosure of unlawfully intercepted communications a further 
                     
     
4This appeal presents solely questions of law, over which we 
exercise plenary review.  See United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 
126, 128 (3d Cir. 1995). 
     
5Most of the provisions not discussed in the text relate 
either to manufacture and confiscation of communication 
intercepting devices, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2512 & 2513, or to the 
procedures whereby government investigative and law enforcement 
officers can obtain authorization to intercept communications and 
disclose and use the contents of them, id. §§ 2516-2519.  Other 
sections provide for the Attorney General to seek an injunction 
against any person engaged in or about to engage in a felony 
violation of Title III, id. § 2521, and for a court authorizing 
an interception to order a noncomplying telecommunications 
carrier to comply with the order, id. § 2522. 
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violation of the statute.  It provides for criminal punishment of 
any person who “intentionally discloses, or endeavors to 
disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that 
the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, 
oral, or electronic communication in violation of this 
subsection.”  Id. § 2511(1)(c).  In addition to criminal 
sanctions against those who unlawfully intercept communications, 
the statute also provides a civil remedy.  Under § 2520, “any 
person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is 
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of 
this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or 
entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be 
appropriate.”  Id. § 2520(a). 
 As a third remedy for violations of § 2511, “Title III 
contains a strict exclusionary rule,” Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 855, 
prohibiting use of intercepted wire or oral communications and 
the fruits thereof in specified proceedings, including, in 
particular, grand jury proceedings.  Section 2515 provides that: 
 Whenever any wire or oral communication has 
been intercepted, no part of the contents of 
such communication and no evidence derived 
therefrom may be received in evidence in any 
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or 
before any court, grand jury, department, 
officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative 
committee, or other authority of the United 
States, a State, or a political subdivision 
thereof if the disclosure of that information 
would be in violation of this chapter. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2515. 
 Finally, § 2518(10)(a)(i) authorizes any “aggrieved 
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person”--that is, “a person who was a party to any intercepted 
wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom 
the interception was directed,” id. § 2510(11)--to move to 
suppress the contents of any unlawfully intercepted 
communication.  It states: 
 Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, 
or proceeding in or before any court, 
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, 
or other authority of the United States, a 
State, or a political subdivision thereof, 
may move to suppress the contents of any wire 
or oral communication intercepted pursuant to 
this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, 
on the grounds that-- 
  (i) the communication was unlawfully  
 intercepted . . . . 
      
Id. § 2518(10)(a)(i).6 
 Here, the target and the husband claim to be aggrieved 
persons within the meaning of § 2510, and they seek to enforce  
§ 2515's exclusionary rule to prohibit introduction to the grand 
jury of communications unlawfully intercepted by the witness.  In 
response, the government stresses that § 2518 does not list grand 
jury proceedings among the proceedings in which an aggrieved 
person may move to suppress evidence.  The government further 
contends that, even if the target and husband can properly move 
to enforce § 2515 in the context of a grand jury investigation,  
§ 2515 contains a “clean hands” exception that permits disclosure 
to a grand jury of communications that were unlawfully 
                     
     
6Aggrieved persons may also move to suppress on the grounds 
that the communication was intercepted pursuant to a court 
authorization that was insufficient on its face or intercepted in 
a manner not in conformity with an appropriate authorization.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii)-(iii). 
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intercepted by a private party without government complicity. 
 
 II.  Standing and Jurisdiction 
 The government argues that the target and the husband 
lacked standing to proceed before the district court and now lack 
standing to proceed before us.  The government also claims that 
we have no jurisdiction because the district court’s denial of 
Doe 1 and Doe 2’s motions is not a final order.  We are 
unpersuaded by the government’s arguments.  We conclude that the 
target and husband had standing to file their motion in the 
district court and that they continue to have standing to press 
this appeal.  Moreover, because the subpoena was not directed to 
them, the husband and target did not have the option of being 
held in contempt and creating an immediately appealable order.  
Therefore, the denial of their motions to quash is a final order. 
 
 A.  Standing 
 “In essence the question of standing is whether the 
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the 
dispute . . . .”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).  
Here the government argues that neither the district court nor 
this court could decide the merits of Doe 1 and Doe 2's motions 
to quash the subpoena.  
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 Both standing to sue and standing to appeal have 
constitutional as well as prudential elements.  See Public 
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn 
Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) (referring to 
standing to sue); In re Grand Jury Matter (District Council 33), 
770 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1985) (standing to appeal); see also 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation 
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982) 
(discussing constitutional and prudential standing requirements); 
Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 537-38 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(same).  The constitutional requirement of standing ensures that 
the “irreducible minimum” for Article III federal court 
jurisdiction, that there be “a case or controversy,” is present. 
 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.  “Art. III requires the party who 
invokes the court’s authority to show that he personally has 
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury 
fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be 
redressed by a favorable decision . . . .”  Id. at 472 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  Thus, the three requirements 
for constitutional standing are injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560-61 (1992).   
 The same constitutional minima for standing to sue are 
also required for standing to appeal.  To ensure that the appeals 
court is hearing an actual case or controversy, the appellant 
must be aggrieved by the district court order.  See McLaughlin v. 
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Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 In the instant case, there can be no doubt that the 
target and husband meet the requirements for constitutional 
standing.  Doe 1 and Doe 2 have had their telephone 
communications unlawfully intercepted and recorded by Doe 3, 
making them “aggrieved persons” within the meaning of Title III. 
 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11).  The Act makes each disclosure of an 
unlawfully intercepted communication a separate violation, see 
id. § 2511(1)(c), so Doe 1 and Doe 2 would be injured in fact by 
further invasion of their privacy from disclosure of their 
communications to the grand jury.7  The causes of this injury are 
the subpoena and the government’s motion to compel, and the 
injury is redressable by quashing the subpoena.  Since both 
intervenors remain aggrieved after the district court’s 
disposition, the constitutional requirements for standing to 
appeal as well as standing to sue are satisfied.8 
 Whether the intervenors also satisfy the prudential 
                     
     
7
“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the 
invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would 
exist without the statute.”  Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 
614, 617 n.3 (1973). 
     
8That Doe 1 and Doe 2 satisfied the requirements for 
intervening in the district court does not automatically mean 
they also satisfy the constitutional requirements for appellate 
standing.  See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986).  “The 
relationship between the interests required for intervention in 
the district court and the interests required to confer Article 
III standing on appeal has not been clearly delineated.”  
McLaughlin, 876 F.2d at 313-14.  In the instant case, the 
government does not appeal the district court’s ruling for 
appellants’ on their motions to intervene.  Hence, we are only 
reviewing whether Doe 1 and Doe 2 have standing, and this is not 
the occasion to attempt to clarify the relationship between the 
requirements for intervention and standing to appeal. 
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aspects of the standing requirement presents a more complex 
issue.  Cf. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan Aluminum 
Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336 (1990) (finding that respondents easily 
satisfied constitutional requirements for standing, but that more 
searching inquiry was necessary to determine if prudential 
requirements were also met).  We recently described the concept 
of prudential standing in the following manner: 
 Prudential considerations further limit a 
plaintiff’s ability to establish that she has 
standing.  These considerations require that: 
(1) a litigant "assert his [or her] own legal 
interests rather than those of third 
parties," (2) courts “refrain from 
adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide 
public significance' which amount to 
'generalized grievances,'" and (3) a litigant 
demonstrate that her interests are arguably 
within the "zone of interests" intended to be 
protected by the statute, rule or 
constitutional provision on which the claim 
is based.  The federal courts have adopted 
prudential limits on standing in order "to 
avoid deciding questions of broad social 
import where no individual rights would be 
vindicated and to limit access to the federal 
courts to those litigants best suited to 
assert a particular claim." 
Wheeler, 22 F.3d at 538 (citations omitted). 
 None of the prudential concerns discussed in Wheeler 
bars the target and husband from having standing to sue or 
standing to appeal in this case.  In both the district court and 
here, the intervenors are asserting their own legal interests 
under Title III.  Although they seek to quash a subpoena directed 
to a third party, and though their success in quashing that 
subpoena would have legal consequences for the witness, the 
target and husband’s claim is based on protecting their own 
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statutory right to privacy by preventing a further disclosure of 
their communications.9  Their claim presents neither an abstract 
question nor a generalized grievance.  Instead, it presents a 
precise question arising from a specific grievance about the use 
of grand jury subpoena power to compel production of recordings 
made in violation of the law.  The privacy interests the target 
and husband assert are certainly within the “zone of interests” 
that Title III is intended to protect.  Because it is Doe 1 and 
Doe 2 whose privacy has been violated and would again be violated 
by compliance with the subpoena, and since Doe 3 is the 
perpetrator of the unlawful recordings, it is the intervenors and 
not the witness herself who are best suited to assert the Title 
III claim.  Recognizing standing in the target and husband in no 
way threatens to enmesh the federal courts in an action where no 
individual rights could be vindicated. 
                     
     
9Even if Doe 1 and Doe 2 are viewed as asserting the 
interests of Doe 3 and not of themselves, this would not 
necessarily deprive them of standing.  We apply a balancing test 
to determine whether a litigant has prudential standing to bring 
an action on behalf of a third party.  See Wheeler, 22 F.3d at 
539 n.11.  The factors we consider in applying this test include 
potential conflicts of interest between the litigant and the 
third party, obstacles to suit by the third party, and the 
closeness of the relationship between the litigant and the third 
party.  See id.  Since we conclude that the target and husband 
have prudential standing to assert their own interests under 
Title III, we need not decide whether they would have standing to 
assert the witness’ interests. 
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 The three prudential considerations we described in 
Wheeler are the three which are referred to most commonly in 
discussions of prudential standing.  See, e.g., Stehney v. Perry, 
101 F.3d 925, 930-31 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Wheeler 
considerations, finding that litigant satisfied all three, and 
concluding that litigant had prudential standing); UPS Worldwide 
Forwarding, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 66 F.3d 621, 626-
31 (3d Cir. 1995) (same).  However, neither this court nor the 
Supreme Court has restricted the scope of prudential analysis to 
just these three considerations.  See generally Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“Standing doctrine embraces several 
judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction, such as [the three considerations listed in 
Wheeler].") (emphasis added).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
insisted that “standing in its outer dimensions is a prudential 
concept to be shaped by the decisions of the courts as a matter 
of sound judicial policy and subject to the control of Congress." 
 Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989); see also 
Bennett v. Spear, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997) 
(stating that Congress can modify or abrogate prudential standing 
requirements).  This can only mean that lower courts, when 
confronted with a question of whether to recognize prudential 
standing in a particular litigant, must consider all factors 
relevant to making "sound judicial policy." 
 It is therefore appropriate to consider an additional 
prudential concern in determining whether to recognize standing 
in this case.  Specifically, we must consider whether finding 
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standing in Doe 1 and Doe 2 would unduly impede the grand jury 
investigatory process and thereby frustrate the public interest 
in fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws.  See 
generally United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).  “As 
a necessary consequence of its investigatory function, the grand 
jury paints with a broad brush.”  United States v. R. 
Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991).  “Traditionally the 
grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire into 
violations of criminal law.”  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 343 (1974).  However, it is equally true that “the powers of 
the grand jury are not unlimited.”  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 
665, 688 (1972); see also R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 299; 
Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 11.  Just as grand juries must operate 
within the confines of the Constitution, see Branzburg, 408 U.S. 
at 708, so too must they comply with the limitations imposed on 
them by Congress (as long as those limitations are not 
unconstitutional). 
 We perceive two ways in which a recognition of standing 
here might be regarded as having a potential to impede the grand 
jury's investigative process.  First, in those instances where a 
subpoena is quashed, this would, of course, deprive the grand 
jury of information it would otherwise have.  But this kind of 
deprivation is properly attributable to Congress and cannot be 
cited as a prudential basis for denying standing.  Congress 
decided when it adopted § 2515 that the grand jury is not 
permitted to receive the type of evidence sought by the subpoena 
here. 
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 Second, a recognition of standing in situations such as 
this one will undoubtedly result in delays in grand jury 
investigations while trial courts are ruling on motions to quash 
and appellate courts are reviewing those rulings.  While we 
acknowledge the general undesirability of such delays, it is 
nevertheless true that motion to quash practice has not 
traditionally been regarded as an unreasonable burden on grand 
jury proceedings.  This is true whether the motion to quash is 
filed by the subject of a subpoena or by a third party with an 
important interest at stake. 
 The Supreme Court and this court have on several 
occasions allowed third parties to move to quash grand jury 
subpoenas directed to others.  See generally Stehney, 101 F.3d at 
931 (after concluding that constitutional and prudential standing 
requirements were satisfied, stating that another reason for 
recognizing standing is that courts have done so for similarly-
situated plaintiffs in other cases).  It is well-established that 
a litigant may have sufficiently important, legally-cognizable 
interests in the materials or testimony sought by a grand jury 
subpoena issued to another person to give the litigant standing 
to challenge the validity of that subpoena.  See, e.g., Gravel v. 
United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (asserting constitutional 
privilege, U.S. Senator may move to intervene and quash subpoena 
directed at his assistant); In re Grand Jury Matter (JFK 
Hospital), 802 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1986) (assuming intervenor 
has proprietary interest in third party’s subpoenaed records, 
intervenor has standing to appeal denial of motion to quash 
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subpoena); District Council 33, 770 F.2d at 39 (same); In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 
1979) (allowing nonsubpoenaed client to intervene and appeal 
order directed to subpoenaed attorney that affected attorney-
client privilege); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Intervenor A), 
587 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1978) (asserting invasion of 
privilege, Representative has standing to intervene and move to 
quash subpoena directed to Clerk of House of Representatives); In 
the Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1976 (Freedman), 541 
F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that attorney has standing 
to intervene and challenge subpoena directed at prothonotary on 
basis of attorney’s claim of privilege). 
 In In re Matter of Grand Jury (Schmidt), 619 F.2d 1022, 
1026-27 (3d Cir. 1980), we discussed the types of interests that 
may be asserted by a party other than the subject of the grand 
jury subpoena if that party is to have standing to quash the 
subpoena.10  There a federal grand jury had directed subpoenas ad 
testificandum to six employees of Schmidt.  Schmidt moved to 
intervene and to quash the subpoenas, arguing that the grand jury 
was not investigating federal crimes and that the subpoenas were, 
therefore, abusive.  Prior to Schmidt, all of our cases 
recognizing intervenor standing to quash a subpoena directed at 
                     
     
10Schmidt’s discussion of the intervenor-employer’s standing 
to move to quash a subpoena directed at its employees does not 
distinguish between standing to sue and standing to appeal.  See 
619 F.2d at 1026-27.  Yet, by deciding that the employer had 
standing to move to quash the subpoena, and by reaching the 
merits of its claims on appeal, we necessarily found that the 
employer had both standing to sue and standing to appeal. 
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another had involved intervenors with a property interest in, or 
claim of privilege respecting, the information or materials 
sought by the subpoena.  Thus, the government urged us to hold 
that standing in this context could only be present in those who 
could claim a property interest or privilege that had been (or 
would be) invaded by compliance with the subpoena. 
 We rejected this limitation as nonviable, explaining 
that we could imagine cases where other "valued rights" besides 
property or privilege would be affected and the intervenor would 
have standing.  Id. at 1026.  We concluded: 
Third party standing to assert claims of grand jury 
abuse cannot be determined by categorizing 
the claimed interest as one of property or 
privilege, but only by examining the nature 
of the abuse, and asking whether, and in what 
manner, it impinges upon the legitimate 
interests of the party allegedly abused. 
Id. at 1027; see also United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 712 
(7th Cir. 1982) (citing Schmidt, explaining that “party has 
standing to move to quash a subpoena addressed to another if the 
subpoena infringes upon the movant’s legitimate interests,” and 
holding that prosecutor had standing to move to quash trial 
subpoena based on his interests in having trial proceed 
expeditiously and without harassment to witness or undue 
prejudice to his case); but see In re Subpoenas to Local 478, 708 
F.2d 65, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1983) (criticizing Schmidt and saying 
that third party has standing to appeal denial of motion to quash 
only where district court’s order affects “fundamental rights 
whose legal and practical value will be destroyed if not 
vindicated on collateral review”). 
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 Here, the interests asserted by the target and the 
husband can fairly be said to resemble a privilege.  In light of 
Schmidt, however, we need not characterize their interests as 
such in order to find standing.  While Schmidt involved a motion 
to quash a subpoena ad testificandum on the basis of alleged 
grand jury abuse in the form of investigation of non-federal 
crimes, Schmidt’s reasoning, and particularly its rejection of 
restricting standing solely to property or privilege interests, 
applies beyond these narrow factual and legal circumstances.  
 Difficult questions may arise as to whether an 
intervenor’s interest, if not a property interest or a privilege, 
is the kind of interest on which third party standing to quash a 
subpoena may be predicated, but we do not believe the instant 
case presents a difficult question.  The husband and target have 
moved to quash the witness’ subpoena in order to protect privacy 
interests created and protected by Title III.  Title III is 
intended to give “maximum protection” to these privacy interests, 
Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 857, interests which we have found 
“sufficiently weighty” to justify even limitations on the Sixth 
Amendment right of public access to court proceedings.  Id. at 
856-57 (ordering that pretrial hearings be closed to public to 
extent reasonably necessary to protect against disclosure of 
unlawfully intercepted communications).  The Act protects the 
privacy interests asserted here by making it a crime for 
unlawfully intercepted communications to be disclosed to anyone, 
including the grand jury, § 2511(1)(c), and by additionally and 
explicitly prohibiting presentation of such evidence to a grand 
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jury, § 2515.  For the district court to compel enforcement of 
the subpoena would, if Doe 1 and Doe 2 are right on the merits, 
be in direct contradiction of these statutory provisions, and 
would therefore involve the district court in the commission of a 
federal crime. 
 We conclude that the privacy interests protected by 
Title III, which expressly include the interests in not having 
one’s unlawfully intercepted communications disclosed to a grand 
jury or otherwise disclosed, are interests on which one may 
predicate standing to quash a subpoena, including a subpoena 
directed to another person.  Accordingly, we hold that Doe 1 and 
Doe 2 satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements for 
both standing to sue and standing to appeal.  
 Before turning to the government's attack on our 
appellate jurisdiction, we pause to consider another contention 
the government advances, erroneously we think, as a standing 
argument.  It is that Doe 1 and Doe 2 are entitled to no relief 
because § 2518(10)(a)(i) does not authorize a motion to suppress 
in a grand jury proceeding.  We believe this is more accurately 
characterized as a contention that one in the position of Doe 1 
and Doe 2 lacks a cause of action to seek the relief sought 
here.11  While we agree that § 2518(10)(a)(i) does not confer 
                     
     
11See generally Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 
(1979) (“[S]tanding is a question of whether a plaintiff is 
sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create an Art. III case 
or controversy, or at least to overcome prudential limitations on 
federal-court jurisdiction, cause of action is a question of 
whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of 
litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the 
power of the court . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
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upon Doe 1 and Doe 2 a right to secure a suppression order in the 
present context, we conclude that Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 17(c) and the traditional motion to quash practice that 
it authorizes do confer upon them a cause of action to move to 
quash the subpoena duces tecum. 
 Under § 2518(10)(a)(i), an aggrieved person such as the 
target and the husband “may move to suppress the contents of any 
wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter 
or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that . . . the 
communication was unlawfully intercepted.”  Section 2518 lists a 
number of proceedings in which an aggrieved person may file such 
a motion to suppress, but grand jury proceedings are absent from 
this list.  Therefore, as we observed in a prior case,  
§ 2518(10)(a) does not authorize a victim of an illegal wiretap 
to move to suppress unlawful Title III evidence before the grand 
jury.  See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Egan), 450 F.2d 199, 206 
(3d Cir. 1971), aff'd, Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 
(1972); see also United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 248 (6th 
Cir. 1976) (holding that § 2518(10)(a) does not authorize grand  
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jury target to file pre-indictment motion to suppress); Dudley v. 
United States, 427 F.2d 1140, 1141-42 (5th Cir. 1970) (same). 
 Here, however, Doe 1 and Doe 2 did not file motions to 
suppress.  Instead, they filed motions to quash a subpoena.  
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) creates a right in 
specified circumstances to secure relief from a court in the form 
of an order quashing a grand jury subpoena duces tecum.  Rule 
17(c) states: “The court on motion made promptly may quash or 
modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or 
oppressive.”  Despite the importance of a generally unfettered 
grand jury investigative process, “the grand jury’s subpoena 
power is not unlimited,” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346, and Rule 
17(c) motions to quash are indisputably one of the “limit[s] 
imposed on a grand jury.”  R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 299; see 
also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346 n.4.  “Grand juries are subject to 
judicial control and subpoenas to motions to quash.”  Branzburg, 
408 U.S. at 708; see also In re Horn, 976 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 
1992) (granting attorney’s Rule 17(c) motion to quash subpoena 
that was overbroad and unreasonable because compliance would 
violate attorney-client privilege). 
 There is nothing in the language or structure of Rule 
17(c) or Title III suggesting that Rule 17(c) cannot be used by a 
victim of an unlawful interception to protect his or her privacy 
interests under Title III.  We read Congress’s decision not to 
authorize a motion to suppress evidence before the grand jury as 
nothing more than that.  If Congress had also intended to 
prohibit third parties from using traditional motion to quash 
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practice to enforce their rights under Title III, we believe it 
would have done so by stating in Title III that § 2518(10)(a)(i) 
is the exclusive means of enforcing § 2515 in a grand jury 
context.12  We therefore hold that Rule 17(c) provides a cause of 
action for an aggrieved person to move to quash a grand jury 
                     
     
12The government relies heavily on the following statement 
in the legislative history: 
  
[Section 2518(10)(a)] must be read in connection with 
section[] 2515 . . . which it limits.  It provides the 
remedy for the right created by section 2515.  Because 
no person is a party as such to a grand jury 
proceeding, the provision does not envision the making 
of a motion to suppress in the context of such a 
proceeding itself.  Normally, there is no limitation on 
the character of evidence that may be presented to a 
grand jury, which is enforcible [sic] by an individual. 
 There is no intent to change this general rule.  It is 
the intent of the provision only that when a motion to 
suppress is granted in another context, its scope may 
include use in a future grand jury proceeding. 
 
S. Rep. No. 90-1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2195. 
 
 The drafter of § 2518(10)(a) clearly regarded a grand jury 
proceeding as something distinct from a court proceeding, and 
sought not to alter the general rule that motions to suppress 
cannot be filed in a pre-indictment setting.  The legislative 
history, like the Act itself, is silent on motions to quash.  
Nothing in the legislative history of § 2518(10)(a) suggests that 
Congress made a decision that traditional motion to quash 
practice before a court would be unavailable to an aggrieved 
party.  Nor has the government suggested any reason why Congress, 
after specifically prohibiting the use of illegally intercepted 
communications by a grand jury, might have wanted that practice 
to be unavailable.  In this connection, we note that Congress 
clearly did not intend that all persons aggrieved by grand jury 
conduct in violation of § 2515 have no remedy other than  
§ 2518(10)(a).  As we have pointed out, § 2520 provides an 
aggrieved party with a civil action against a violator to recover 
"such relief as may be appropriate."  Moreover, as the Supreme 
Court held in Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972), it is 
entirely consistent with the Congressional intent behind Title 
III for those aggrieved persons who are the subject of a grand 
jury subpoena to simply refuse to comply and use § 2515 as a 
shield in the ensuing contempt proceeding. 
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subpoena duces tecum compliance with which would violate §§ 2515 
and 2511(1)(c). 
 In reaching this conclusion, we reject the notion that 
there is something inherently inconsistent about a party having a 
right to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum when he or she 
has no right to move to suppress the evidence that is the subject 
of the subpoena.  The relief that may result from the 
intervenors’ motion to quash is equivalent to the relief that 
would result from a successful motion to suppress only because 
the government does not possess the evidence the grand jury has 
ordered to be produced.  In the large number of cases where the 
government already has the evidence that an aggrieved person 
asserts cannot be introduced to the grand jury, a motion to quash 
will do the aggrieved person no good, because there will be no 
subpoena to be quashed.  Here, however, the grand jury must 
employ its subpoena powers and the enforcement authority of the 
courts to obtain the evidence it seeks.  We do not believe 
Congress intended the grand jury and the courts to use their 
respective powers to compel violations of Title III.  When a 
subpoena is required to gain access to illegally intercepted 
communications, the independent checks on use of the subpoena 
power provide a cause of action to enforce the § 2515 evidentiary 
prohibition. 
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 B.  Final Order 
 In order for us to have appellate jurisdiction, the 
target and husband must not only have standing to appeal; the 
district court’s order must also be a final order as to them.  
See JFK Hospital, 802 F.2d at 99; District Council 33, 770 F.2d 
at 38.  Since we find that the denial of their motions to quash 
was a final order, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to reach 
the merits of this appeal. 
 An order denying a motion to quash is generally not a 
final order permitting immediate appellate review unless the 
movant is held in contempt.  See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 
530 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); 
Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906).  “Where, 
however, a person lacks the opportunity to contest the subpoena 
by disobedience because it is not directed to him or her, an 
order denying a motion to quash is final as to that individual.” 
 District Council 33, 770 F.2d at 38; see also Schmidt, 619 F.2d 
at 1024-25.  “The court’s order denying a motion to quash is 
effectively a final order to those who have no further steps they 
can follow.”  JFK Hospital, 802 F.2d at 98 (finding denial of 
motion to quash to be final order with respect to intervenors who 
could not proceed to contempt or order subject of subpoena to do 
so); see also District Council 33, 770 F.2d at 38 (same).  When 
an intervenor does not have the option of contempt, the denial of 
an intervenor’s motion to quash must be treated as final to 
provide effective appellate review, since the subject of the 
subpoena will frequently be unwilling to suffer the penalties of 
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contempt in order to protect the intervenor's interest.  See FMC 
Corp., 604 F.2d at 800-01.  Without immediate appeal, there would 
be no other proceeding in which the intervenor’s claim could be 
asserted.  See Schmidt, 619 F.2d at 1025. 
 The district court’s denial of Doe 1 and Doe 2's 
motions to quash is a final order as to them.  Since the subpoena 
is directed to Doe 3 and not to themselves, the target and 
husband do not have the option of creating an appealable order by 
standing in contempt.  Although the witness has, thus far, been 
willing to be held in contempt, she has done so on her own 
behalf, on grounds entirely different from those the intervenors 
have asserted.  There is no guarantee she will continue to  
accept contempt, and the target and husband’s opportunity for 
appellate review should not be dependent on her willingness to do 
so. 
 
III.  Merits 
 We come, finally, to the merits of the intervenors’ 
motions to quash the grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued to 
the witness.  The target and the husband contend that the motion 
must be quashed because compliance with it would constitute a 
violation of § 2515, prohibiting introduction to a grand jury of 
unlawfully intercepted communications, and of § 2511(1)(c), 
prohibiting disclosure of unlawfully intercepted communications. 
 We agree. 
 The government does not contest that compliance with a 
subpoena requiring a violation of §§ 2515 and 2511(1)(c) would be 
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"unreasonable" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 17(c).  Nor does it dispute that compliance with the 
subpoena duces tecum currently before us would be a violation of 
the literal terms of §§ 2515 and 2511(1)(c).  It could not in 
good faith contend otherwise.  The language of § 2515 could not 
be any clearer: “Whenever any wire or oral communication has been 
intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no 
evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any  
. . . proceeding . . . before any . . . grand jury . . . if the 
disclosure of that information would be in violation of this 
chapter.”  18 U.S.C. § 2515.  Section 2511(1)(c) is also 
unambiguous, making it a crime whenever one "intentionally 
discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any person the contents 
of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having 
reason to know that the information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in 
violation of this subsection."  Id. § 2511(1)(c).  Since it is 
conceded by all parties that Doe 3's interceptions were made in 
violation of § 2511(1)(a), and disclosure of the contents of the 
intercepted communications would be a violation of § 2511(1)(c), 
the plain language of § 2515 prohibits use of the subpoenaed 
materials as grand jury evidence. 
 Yet, despite these concessions, the government insists 
that the district court properly denied Doe 1 and Doe 2 relief 
because there is an unarticulated "clean hands" exception to the 
strictures of §§ 2515 and 2511(1)(c).  We are not persuaded.13 
                     
     
13We note that two other federal circuit courts have been 
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 It is true, as the government emphasizes, that “in rare 
cases [where] the literal application of a statute will produce a 
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,” 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570-71 
(1982), we may look to those intentions rather than the literal 
terms of the statute.  See also United States v. American 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-44 (1940) (“When [a 
statute’s plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results  
. . . this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of 
the act.  Frequently . . . even when the plain meaning did not 
produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one plainly at 
variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole this Court 
has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.”) 
(internal quotations and footnotes omitted).  This is not such a 
“rare case,” however.  Literal application of §§ 2515 and 
2511(1)(c) means only that the grand jury cannot hear the 
contents of unlawfully intercepted communications.  This protects 
the privacy of Doe 1 and Doe 2 from further invasions, consistent 
with the intent of Title III.  Thus, application of the plain 
language of §§ 2515 and 2511(1)(c) leads to no absurd, futile, or 
even unreasonable result in this case.  Cf. United States v. 
Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 111-12 (6th Cir. 1987) (departing from 
plain language where it would allow defendant to shield himself 
                                                                  
presented with the question of whether to read this same clean 
hands exception into § 2515 and have reached conflicting 
conclusions.  See United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (deciding that § 2515 does contain clean hands 
exception); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(rejecting clean hands exception). 
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from prosecution under anti-gambling statute by suppressing 
communications he unlawfully intercepted to further illicit 
gambling scheme, clearly an absurd and unintended result of Title 
III). 
 Even if we were prepared to ignore the literal language 
of the statute, however, we find no other indication that 
Congress intended the clean hands exception the government would 
have us read into §§ 2515 and 2511(1)(c).  The statutory 
structure makes it clear that any interceptions of communications 
and invasions of individual privacy are prohibited unless 
expressly authorized in Title III.  See Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 46; 
Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 855.  The invasion of Doe 1 and Doe 2's 
privacy that would result from introduction of Doe 3's recordings 
to the grand jury is nowhere expressly authorized under Title 
III, clearly suggesting that Congress intended no clean hands 
exception. 
 The government cites a statement in the legislative 
history, to the effect that “[t]he perpetrator must be denied the 
fruits of his unlawful actions in civil and criminal 
proceedings,” 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2156, to support its 
contention that Congress did not intend to deprive the government 
of the use of unlawful evidence when the government is not the 
“perpetrator” of the illegal interception.  But this statement 
evidences no intent that a non-perpetrator may use the fruits of 
another’s unlawful actions.  To the contrary, the statute and its 
legislative history provide that anyone who discloses the 
contents of a communication knowing it to be the fruit of an 
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illegal invasion of privacy is guilty of a criminal offense, see 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c); 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2181-82, and 
likewise § 2515's evidentiary prohibition must be applied to 
perpetrators and non-perpetrators alike. 
 Moreover, if we were to concern ourselves with the 
cleanliness of hands, there would be no reason to limit our 
consideration to the hands of the government alone.  It is the 
grand jury that issued the subpoena, and it is the district court 
that ordered it to be enforced.  Given the unambiguous language 
of § 2515, compliance with the subpoena would be a violation of 
an express congressional prohibition.  Were we to allow a 
compelled violation of this federal law, the hands of the grand 
jury, the district court, and ourselves would all become sullied. 
 See Egan, 450 F.2d at 209 ("It seems beyond question that a 
district court may not compel the violation of an express 
congressional prohibition.").  Since § 2515 was enacted, in part, 
"to protect the integrity of court . . . proceedings," Gelbard, 
408 U.S. at 51 (internal quotations omitted), Congress cannot 
have intended that we ignore any taint on grand jury and judicial 
hands.  In short, it is incomprehensible that Congress intended 
the admissibility of unlawfully intercepted communications to  
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turn solely on whether the government participated in the 
interceptions. 
 We agree with the intervenors that, when enacting Title 
III, Congress performed all of the balancing necessary of the 
public interest in law enforcement against the privacy interests 
of citizens.  As we said in Cianfrani,  
 Congress’s overriding interest in protecting 
privacy to the maximum extent possible is 
evident in Title III.  The legislative 
history of the statute emphasizes the concern 
of its drafters that the Act preserve as much 
as could be preserved of the privacy of 
communications, consistent with the 
legitimate law enforcement needs that the 
statute also sought to effectuate.  
Similarly, the complex and overlapping 
provisions are strong evidence that Congress 
intended to regulate strictly disclosure of 
intercepted communications, limiting the 
public revelation of even interceptions 
obtained in accordance with the Act to 
certain narrowly defined circumstances.  
 
573 F.2d at 856.  We have no authority to restrike the balance 
that Congress has already struck by placing in the statute a 
clean hands exception that Congress did not. 
 In sum, Title III is designed to protect the privacy of 
communications and the integrity of the courts.  Compliance with 
the subpoena duces tecum directed to Doe 3 would violate § 2515's 
evidentiary prohibition and would work a further invasion of Doe 
1 and Doe 2's privacy rights in violation of § 2511(1)(c).  
Compliance with the subpoena would, therefore, be unreasonable, 
and the subpoena must be quashed. 
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 IV.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court, and remand with an order to grant the intervenors’ motions 
to quash the subpoena duces tecum. 
In re Grand Jury, Nos. 97-7016/17 
 
SLOVITER, dissenting. 
  I do not disagree with the proposition that a 
person aggrieved under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2510-2522 (“Title III”), should have the right to preclude the 
use of illegally intercepted communications at a criminal 
proceeding, whether or not the government was responsible for the 
interception.  Nor do I disagree with the proposition that such a 
person should have the right at an appropriate time to quash a 
subpoena issued to a third person ordering production of such 
communications.  However, I do disagree with the majority’s 
holding that a third party, such as a target or subject of a 
grand jury investigation, may move to quash the subpoena issued 
to a witness during the grand jury investigation.  This holding 
runs counter to the well-established precedent disallowing 
procedures that would delay and disrupt grand jury proceedings.  
While I share the majority’s disapproval of the witness’s actions 
in illegally intercepting communications, I believe that the 
majority’s interpretation of Title III is contrary to the 
statutory framework and the prudential principles underlying the 
statute.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the 
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district court’s dismissal of the intervenors’ motions to quash 
for lack of standing. 
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 A. 
  My difference with the majority is narrow insofar 
as the scope of the substantive provisions of Title III are 
concerned, but fundamental insofar as its enforcement provisions 
are concerned.  As the majority points out, § 2515 provides a 
categorical exclusionary remedy for violations of Title III, 
expressly proscribing the admission of illegally wiretapped 
evidence in various specified proceedings, including grand jury 
proceedings.  But the exclusionary remedy of § 2515 is not self-
executing.  The legislative history of Title III explains that § 
2515 “must, of course, be read in light of § 2518(10)(a) . . . , 
which defines the class entitled to make a motion to suppress.”  
S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 
2185 [”Senate Report”].  Significantly, § 2518(10)(a) does not 
list a grand jury investigation among the list of specified 
proceedings in which suppression motions may be filed. 
  It is this tension between the two sections that 
forms the basis of my difference with the majority.  I believe 
that we are bound by the statutory language, and that what 
appears to be a paradoxical result - one section granting a right 
and the other withholding a remedy - is reconcilable by a literal 
reading of the statute and the explanation given in the 
legislative history.  Congress saw the two provisions as 
dependent and reflexive; Congress intended § 2518(10)(a) to 
restrict § 2515.  The Senate Report states that § 2518(10)(a) 
“must be read in connection with sections 2515 and 2517, . . . 
which it limits.  It provides the remedy for the right created by 
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section 2515.”  Id. at 2195. 
  By relying on Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the majority glides over the fact that § 
2518(10)(a), which gives aggrieved persons the right to file 
motions to suppress such intercepted communications at various 
proceedings, conspicuously omits proceedings before the grand 
jury.  Rule 17(c) governs motions to quash subpoenas when 
“compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.”  Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 17(c).  But a rule cannot trump a statute, and the majority’s 
solution undermines the clearly discernible policy goal of § 
2518(10)(a)'s limitation on the filing of motions to suppress, 
namely, to prevent interference and delay with grand jury 
investigations.  This policy applies with equal force to the 
filing of motions to quash. 
  The reason for the omission of grand jury 
proceedings from the suppression provision of § 2518(10)(a) is 
set forth in the Senate Report, which states: 
Because no person is a party as such to a grand 
jury proceeding, the provision does 
not envision the making of a motion 
to suppress in the context of such 
a proceeding itself.  Normally 
there is no limitation on the 
character of evidence that may be 
presented to a grand jury, which is 
enforceable by an individual.  
(Blue v. United States, 86 S.Ct. 
1416, 384 U.S. 251 (1965).)  There 
is no intent to change this general 
rule. 
 
S. Rep. No. 90-1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2195 
(emphasis added). 
  It was this policy and similar explanations in the 
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legislative history commenting on the language of Title III that 
led the Supreme Court in Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 
(1972), a case on which the majority relies, to distinguish 
between a grand jury witness who seeks to stand on the illegality 
of the interception as a basis for refusal to answer and a non-
witness potential defendant who seeks to intrude into the grand 
jury proceedings.  After undertaking a thorough analysis of the 
legislative history of Title III, the Court held that a witness 
in a grand jury proceeding who was cited for contempt for refusal 
to answer questions that were based upon illegally intercepted 
communications could use the suppression provision of § 2515 as a 
“just cause” defense.  See Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 59.  The Court 
concluded that a witness was not foreclosed from using § 2515's 
remedy only because that witness was not a target of a grand jury 
investigation.  See id.  The Court stated in broad terms equally 
applicable here, 
The congressional concern with the applicability 
of § 2518(10)(a) in grand jury 
proceedings, so far as it is 
discernible from the Senate report, 
was apparently that defendants and 
potential defendants might be able 
to utilize suppression motions to 
impede the issuance of indictments. 
. . . 
 
Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added). 
  As the court commented in United States v. Woods, 
544 F.2d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 
(1977),  Gelbard “drew a careful distinction between a witness 
before the grand jury, who it held may refuse to answer questions 
based upon illegal interceptions, and a defendant or potential 
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defendant.” 
  The “general rule” referred to in the Senate 
Report and incorporated into the statute was described in United 
States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966), a case in which a defendant 
sought pretrial dismissal of his indictment on tax fraud charges 
on the ground that it was procured in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.  The district court 
granted the motion, but the Supreme Court reversed.  It explained 
that because criminal defendants have an opportunity to vindicate 
their rights at trial, they should not be permitted to interrupt 
the normal progress of a grand jury investigation.  Id. at 255 
(commenting that because tainted evidence is admissible in grand 
jury proceedings a defendant would only be able to suppress such 
evidence or “its fruits if they were sought to be used against 
him at trial”).  
  The Senate Report accompanying Title III cited to 
Blue, a reference that was noted by the Supreme Court in Gelbard, 
408 U.S. at 60.  Gelbard affirmed our decision in In re Grand 
Jury (Egan), 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971), where we stated: 
The reference in the legislative history [of Title 
III] to Blue demonstrates at most a 
congressional intent to preclude an 
attack on a grand jury 
investigation by one whose interest 
in such investigation is not as a 
witness, but as a defendant, and 
instead to require such person to 
move for the exclusion of the 
questionable evidence after the 
indictment or at a time designated 
by the rules of criminal procedure. 
  
 
Egan, 450 F.2d at 205.  We held that Sister Egan, a witness who 
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refused to answer questions in a grand jury proceeding, could 
invoke the § 2515 remedy because she was not a prospective 
defendant, and thus was “not attempting to block an indictment 
that might be returned by the grand jury, but rather is asserting 
her right as a citizen to vindicate her privilege.”  Id. at 205-
06. 
  The structure of the relevant provisions of Title 
III and its legislative history show that Congress intended to 
prevent targets and subjects of grand jury investigations, who 
would have the opportunity to challenge illegally intercepted 
communications at trial, from filing any motions that would 
inhibit the functioning of the grand jury. 
  It is true, as the majority notes, that motions to 
quash are not expressly proscribed by Title III.  However, in 
light of Congress’s emphasis on protecting the uninterrupted 
functioning of the grand jury, we must interpret Title III in a 
way that channels motions to quash a subpoena duces tecum, like 
motions to suppress, to trial proceedings, rather than to grand 
jury proceedings.  The inclusion of grand jury proceedings in the 
exclusionary remedy of § 2515 entitles a grand jury witness, but 
not third parties, to rely on that provision. 
  The congressional intentions behind Title III flow 
from the unique role occupied by the grand jury.  It conducts an 
inquisitorial proceeding that seeks to determine if a crime has 
been committed or if criminal charges should be brought against 
any person, rather than an adversarial proceeding in which guilt 
or innocence is determined. See United States v. R. Enterprises, 
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Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991). 
  Consistent with this function, numerous procedures 
are permitted in the grand jury that would not be acceptable in a 
criminal trial.  The grand jury “paints with a broad brush,” id., 
and the scope of its investigative power is necessarily very 
broad.  See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (“A 
grand jury investigation is not fully carried out until every 
available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in 
every proper way to find if a crime has been committed.” 
(internal quotations omitted)).  It conducts its investigation in 
the absence of a judge, deliberates in secret, and is not 
restrained by the technical rules of procedure and evidence that 
govern criminal trials.  See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 344 (1974). 
  As the Supreme Court said of the grand jury nearly 
eighty years ago: 
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of 
investigation and inquisition, the 
scope of whose inquiries is not to 
be limited narrowly by questions of 
propriety or forecasts of the 
probable result of the 
investigation, or by doubts whether 
any particular individual will be 
found properly subject to an 
accusation of crime. 
 
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (witness not 
entitled to make objections based on irrelevance or 
incompetence); see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 
364 (1956) (hearsay rules inapplicable to grand jury proceedings 
because strict observance of such rules “would result in 
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interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair 
trial”); Lawn v. United States, 335 U.S. 339-350 (1958) 
(indictment not open to challenge on ground that it was procured 
in violation of Fifth Amendment). 
  Solicitude for the proper and efficient 
functioning of the grand jury has made the Court reluctant to 
authorize procedures that would allow “protracted interruption of 
grand jury proceedings.”  Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 70 (White, J., 
concurring).  Thus, in Calandra, the Court held that the 
exclusionary rule for alleged Fourth Amendment violations would 
not be available at the grand jury stage because the hearings 
necessitated by such a rule “would halt the orderly progress of 
an investigation and might necessitate extended litigation of 
issues only tangentially related to the grand jury’s primary 
objective.”  414 U.S. at 349. 
  In R. Enterprises, the Court held that the 
standards set out in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-
700 (1974), for relevancy and admissibility of documents sought 
by a subpoena duces tecum in the trial stage were not applicable 
at the grand jury stage because such rules would invite 
unacceptable “procedural delays and detours.”  R. Enterprises, 
498 U.S. at 298.  After noting that “We have expressly stated 
that grand jury proceedings should be free of such delays,” the 
Court quoted United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973), 
for the proposition that:  “‘Any holding that would straddle a 
grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would 
assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public’s 
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interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the 
criminal laws.’” Id. at 298-99 (quoting Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 
17). 
  If intervenors were permitted to file motions to 
quash subpoenas duces tecum, the grand jury would be straddled 
with precisely the delay and disruption that Congress sought to 
avoid.  There are numerous potential issues for side litigation 
in a statute as complex as Title III, such as whether an 
intervenor was an “aggrieved person” according to § 2510(11) or 
whether there was in fact a statutory violation under § 2511.  
The majority’s ruling would require adversarial hearings on 
matters peripheral to the grand jury’s investigation and could 
effectively transform the grand jury proceeding into a 
“preliminary trial[] on the merits” in a way that the Court in 
Calandra found unacceptable.  Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350.  The 
consequential appeal, as here, if an intervenor has standing will 
necessarily produce further unacceptable delays in the grand 
jury’s work. 
  I am not convinced that the delay and disruption 
to the grand jury proceedings that the majority’s holding will 
cause are offset by the benefits of the majority’s ruling.  
Allowing parties to exclude such evidence at the grand jury stage 
will do little to prevent future violations of the statute, 
particularly among private citizens.  See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 
351 (“[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved 
by extending the [exclusionary] rule to grand jury proceedings is 
uncertain at best”).  And Congress’s effort to protect an 
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aggrieved person from the disclosure of illegally intercepted 
communications, repeatedly stressed by appellants, must be viewed 
in the context of Congress’s evident contemplation that such 
communications would indeed be disclosed in grand jury 
proceedings by its exclusion from § 2518(10)(a) of motions to 
suppress before the grand jury. 
  As a result, I believe that under Title III third-
party motions to quash, like motions to suppress, are precluded 
at the grand jury stage in the interest of the efficient 
administration of the grand jury process. 
 B. 
  As the majority correctly notes, there have been 
cases in which third parties have been accorded standing to file 
motions to quash grand jury subpoenas where a privilege accorded 
by the Constitution, a statute, or common law was at stake.  See, 
e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (speech and 
debate clause privilege entitled U.S. Senator to quash subpoena 
directed at aide); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 
F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979) (allowing client to intervene to 
challenge subpoena issued to attorney); see also In re Grand Jury 
Matter (John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital), 802 F.2d 96, 99(3d 
Cir. 1986) (third parties accorded standing where their property 
interests were jeopardized).  In those situations, the protection 
afforded by the privilege is destroyed as soon as the privileged 
material is introduced, whether at the grand jury or at trial.  
Communications illegally intercepted are not in the same position 
because, as set forth in the prior section, Congress recognized 
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that disclosure of those communications would occur at the grand 
jury stage when it limited the suppression remedy by omitting the 
grand jury in § 2518(10)(a). 
  The majority relies on dictum from In re Matter of 
Grand Jury (C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (3d 
Cir. 1980), where there was reference in the majority opinion to 
“imagined” instances where other “valued rights” at stake would 
trigger third party standing to quash subpoenas.  Id. at 1026; 
but see In re Subpoena to Local 478, 708 F.2d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 
1983) (Schmidt “lacks a limiting principle”).  In Schmidt, where 
we granted third-party standing, there were a variety of 
interests asserted by the third-party intervenor, including the 
contractual property interest in the service of employees who 
were subject to a subpoena ad testificandum, a property interest 
in the books and records previously subpoenaed, and, most 
fundamentally, the right not to be subject to abuse of the grand 
jury’s process.  In the latter instance, a third-party motion to 
quash is the only mechanism available to challenge the potential 
abuse.  None of these considerations is applicable here where 
there is no allegation of grand jury abuse.  Therefore, the usual 
presumption accorded to the legitimacy of grand jury proceedings 
applies.  See R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 300. 
  Unlike the third parties hypothesized in Schmidt, 
the intervenors here will have an opportunity to challenge the 
statutory violation through a motion to quash or to suppress the 
resulting evidence at the start of their criminal trial should an 
indictment against them emerge from the grand jury.  They also 
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have the right, under the statute, to sue the interceptor of the 
illegal wiretap for civil damages whether or not they are 
ultimately indicted, see § 2520(a), and can file a complaint 
leading to a criminal prosecution of the interceptor, 
see 2511(1)(c). 
C. 
  In sum, I conclude that the statutory framework of 
Title III as well as congressional intentions regarding the 
appropriate mechanisms to redress violations of Title III 
foreclose the intervenors from filing motions to quash subpoena 
duces tecum issued as part of a grand jury investigation.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of the 
intervenors’ motions. 
  
 
  
